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THE EFFECT OF TAX LIMITATION LEGISLATION ON PUBLIC 
SECTOR LABOR MARKETS: A COMMENT 
RONALD G. EHRENBERG* 
[. In t roduct ion 
THIS brief comment presents my views about the current relative economic 
status of state and local government em-
ployees and the growth of collective bar-
gaining and influence of unions in the 
public sector. With these remarks as 
background, I then discuss the likely ef-
fects of tax limitation legislation on public 
sector labor markets. 
I I . Publ ic Employee Compensat ion 
A popular belief seems to be that public 
employees are overpaid, in the sense that 
they receive higher levels of compensation 
than do comparable private sector 
workers. While this is almost certainly 
a valid conclusion for federal government 
employees, it does not appear to be univer-
sally true for state and local government 
employees. In the most comprehensive 
study of the subject to date, Sharon Smith 
estimated the net wage rate premiums 
that were paid to state and local employees 
in 1973 and 1975 vis-a-vis comparable 
quality private sector employees. After 
controlling for a vector of personal char-
acteristics designed to measure employees' 
quality and experience, she concluded that 
males employed by state and local govern-
ments received lower wage rates than 
males with comparable measured charac-
teristics employed in the private sector.2 
In contrast females, especially those em-
ployed by state governments received pos-
itive wage premiums over their private 
sector counterparts.3 However, the magni-
tude of these differentials declined be-
tween 1973 and 1975. Table 1 presents 
estimates of these overall net differentials 
as well as estimates, by occupation cate-
gory and region of the country. While the 
differentials' magnitudes vary across cat-
egories and regions, in almost all cases 
•Professor of Economics and Labor Economics, Cor-
nell University. 
the relative earnings position of state and 
local government employees declined be-
tween 1973 and 1975. Moreover, earnings 
growth data for all private sector and state 
and local government employees (Table 
2) suggest that the relative wage position 
of the government employees has contin-
ued to decline in recent years. 
Contrary to popular opinion then, the 
relative wage position of state and local 
government employees has declined in 
recent years and, at least for males, wages 
on average are likely to currently be below 
the levels paid comparable quality private 
sector workers. Of course, one might reply 
that public employees historically have 
enjoyed greater job stability and the evi-
dence supports this contention. One 
might also argue that focusing on wage 
rates, alone understates the relative 
compensation of public sector employees, 
as fringe benefits, especially pensions, are 
often alleged to be higher in the public 
than the private sector. Indeed, to support 
this latter contention, one might argue 
that politician-employers are more willing 
to giant pension than wage increases to 
public empolyees, as they can often hide 
the true long-run costs of the former from 
the public, thereby increasing their short-
run probabilities of reelection. However, 
this line of reasoning ignores the fact that 
the more generous retirement benefits in 
the public sector can at least partially be 
attributed to most public sector pension 
plans requiring employee contributions, 
while most private sector plans are not 
contributory.5 In sum, the evidence proba-
bly does not suggest that the total 
compensation levels of most state and local 
government employees are currently con-
siderably above the levels of comparable 
individuals employed in the private sector. 
III . Pub l ic Employee Unionization 
The extent of public employee unioniza-
tion has increased rapidly since the early 
Inplied Estinated Percentage Differences Between the Wages of State and Local 
Government Employees and Comparable Private Sector Enployees: 1973 and 1975 
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1960's, and the state and local sector 
represents one of the few sectors in the 
economy in which unions are currently 
not losing ground. Although accurate sta-
tistics on public sector unionization are 
hard to come by, one comprehensive sur-
vey article concluded that the percentage 
of full-time state government employees 
that belonged to labor organizations was 
over 38 percent in 1976.6 In the same year, 
the comparable figure for local govern-
ment employees was 54 percent. These 
numbers should be contrasted with the 
less than 25 percent of the private non-
agricultural sector which is organized. 
Since commentators have asserted that a 
likely outgrowth of tax limitation legisla-
tion will be an increase in union strength 
and union militancy, it is useful to sum-
marize what we know to date about the 
effects of public sector unions on wages 
and benefits.7 
There have been numerous studies pub-
lished on the effect of public sector unions 
on wages. The consensus seems to be that 
state and local government employees' 
unions have raised their members' wages 
by roughly 5 to 15 percent above the 
earnings levels of comparable public em-
ployees in areas in which public employees 
are not unionized.8 These differentials are 
smaller than the union/nonunion dif-
ferentials which have been observed in 
the private sector. 
Table 2 
Cumulative Growth Kates in Earnings in the 
Private and State and Local Governnent Sectors 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1970-1977 57.4 62.2 56.6 50.1 60.0 54.0 53.9 
1975-1977 15.4 15.7 12.2 12.2 12.4 11.8 11.6 
where 
(1) Average weekly earnings of nonsupervisory workers in the private non-
agricultural sector 
(2) Average hourly earnings of nonsupervisory workers in the private non-
agricultural sector 
(3) Average nonthly earnings (AME) of full-tine equivalent (FTE) state and 
local government employees 
(4) AXE of FTE state and local government educational employees 
(5) AME Df FTE state and local government noneducotional employees 
(6) AME of FTE state government employees 
(7) AME of FTE local government employees 
Sources: 
(1) and (2) U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Earnings. October 1976, 
Table CI (percentage change in annual average earnings). 
(3) thru (7) U.S. Bureau of the Census, Public Employment In 1977 (and 
earlier Issues), Tables 7 and 8 (percentage change in October 
earnings figures). 
Given the growing importance of fringe 
benefits in public sector compensation, one 
may be tempted to argue that measured 
union/nonunion wage differentials un-
derstate the true public sector union/non-
union total compensation differentials. 
Presumably this would occur because 
tastes for fringe benefits differ across 
individuals and there is no easy way to 
communicate the preferences of the 
average municipal employee in cities 
without municipal unions to municipal 
employers. As such, compensation in these 
cities would be more heavily weighted 
towards money wages than it would in 
cities in which municipal employees were 
unionized.9 
In fact, however, this argument does 
not appear to be always correct. In an 
unpublished Cornell master's thesis, 
David Rogers has shown that several types 
of nonwage benefits received by police and 
fire fighters were less generous in cities 
in which police and fire fighter unions 
existed than they were in nonunion cities 
in 1975, ceteris paribus.10 A possible ex-
planation for Rogers' findings is that cities 
in which public employees' benefits are 
initially poor are the ones which are most 
susceptible to successful union organizing 
drives. When the time approaches to ne-
gotiate a contract in such a city, the union 
strives to improve its members' nonwage 
benefits. However, if municipal employers 
are resistant to making concessions on 
these issues, the union may maximize its 
members' welfare by settling for larger 
wag;e increases rather than substantial 
benefits improvement.11 As a result, one 
would simultaneously observe positive 
union /nonunion earnings differentials 
and negative union /nonunion benefits 
differentials in the public sector. Put an-
other way, the true effect of municipal 
employees' unions on their members' total 
compensation may be overstated, not un-
derstated, by estimates of union/nonun-
ion wage differentials in the public sector. 
Their overall effect on total compensation 
may be significantly less than 5 to 15 
percent. 
A recent Cornell Ph.D. dissertation has 
also shown that unions tend to increase 
the share of municipal expenditures which 
go towards municipal labor costs.12 To-
gether with the evidence that municipal 
employee unions have had only a small 
effect on their members' compensation 
level, this leads one to conjecture that 
public employee unions are primarily "de-
fensive organizations" and are concerned 
with their members' employment levels, 
as well as their wages. 
IV. Tax Limitation Legislation and 
Publ ic Sector Labor Markets 
Why should the analysis of the effect 
of tax limitation legislation on public 
sector labor markets be any different than 
the analysis of any decline in a communi-
ty's "ability to pay?" Presumably, in the 
latter case public sector unions and public 
employers can push for an increase in the 
size of the public sector relative to total 
community resources, while in the former 
case they are prevented from doing so by 
law. Hence, their option is reduced to 
pusliing for a larger share of public 
expenditures to be devoted to personnel 
costs. Because of this, to the extent that 
tax limitation legislation imposes effec-
tive constraints on public sector budgets, 
wage elasticities of demand for public 
employees must increase.13 The less fa-
vorable (from the employees' perspective) 
trade-off between wages and employment 
should lead to a further reduction in the 
short-run in the relative earnings position 
of state and local government employees. 
Will this decline be a permanent one? 
I doubt it. In choosing between govern-
ment and private employment, potential 
employees weigh both the pecuniary and 
nonpecuniary conditions of employment 
in each. A simultaneous reduction in 
wages and employment stability in the 
public sector invariably must lead to in-
creased job turnover among younger more 
capable existing government employees 
who have private sector alternatives and 
to a decline in the number and quality 
of new job applicants to the state and local 
sector.14 Eventually, relative wages must 
rise if municipalities hope to maintain the 
same quality of their workforces. 
The role of public sector unions must 
also be considered. New York City's ongo-
ing financial crisis has given us one ob-
servation which suggests that in the 
short-run even strong unions may be will-
ing to accept wage freezes and/or real 
and relative wage cuts to avoid the need 
for layoffs during periods of financial 
stringency.15 However, as the period of 
tightness lengthens, pressure builds up to 
grant substantial wage increases to the 
remaining public employees. This pres-
sure will be magnified if a union perceives 
that any reduction in employment neces-
sary to finance the salary increases, will 
come from normal attrition rather than 
layoffs. Again, the result will be rising 
municipal employee wage levels and de-
clining employment levels.16 If, as noted 
above, unions succeed in diverting funds 
from nonpersonnel municipal expenditure 
categories to the personnel budget, the 
decline in employment may be arrested. 
However, in this case, the value of the 
alternative uses of the diverted funds will 
be a cost borne by taxpayers. 
Of course my analysis is colored very 
heavily by the initial experiences under 
proposition 13 in California and by New 
York City's financial problems. If tax or 
expenditure limitation legislation in other 
states do not prove to be binding con-
straints on state and local government 
labor markets, but merely serve to limit 
the rate of expansion in public sector 
budgets, the problems will be less severe. 
Indeed, a situation in which unions and 
public employers know that the total em-
ployment budget will increase over time, 
but at a rate which is less than in previous 
years, provides opportunities for produc-
tivity bargaining and incentive compen-
sation schemes, as unions (employers) 
seek to increase their compensation 
(maintain local government services). 
Unions are more likely to agree to work-
rule changes when the size of the pie is 
increasing than when it is contracting. 
Hence, perhaps it would be wise not to 
generalize too much from the California 
expeience under proposition 13. 
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